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The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions  
and Breakdowns [1989] 
John Higley & Michael G. Burton  
Abstract: »Die Rolle von Eliten in demokratischen Transitionsprozessen und 
beim Zusammenbruch von Demokratien«. Stable democratic regimes depend 
heavily on the “consensual unity” of national elites. So long as elites remain 
disunified, political regimes are unstable, a condition which makes democratic 
transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the 
forms unstable regimes take. Disunity appears to be the generic condition of 
national elites, and disunity strongly tends to persist regardless of socioeco-
nomic development and other changes in mass populations. The consensually 
unified elites that are necessary to stable democracies are created in only a few 
ways, two of the most important of which involve distinctive elite transforma-
tions. After elaborating this argument, we examine the relationship between 
elites and regimes in Western nation-states since they began to consolidate af-
ter 1500. We show that our approach makes good sense of the Western politi-
cal record, that it does much to clarify prospects for stable democracies in de-
veloping societies today, and that it makes the increasingly elite-centered 
analysis of democratic transitions and breakdowns more systematic. 
Keywords: elites, role, democracy, change, political regimes. 
 
The unexpected wave of democratic transitions during the last decade, most 
notably in Latin America and Southern Europe, has attracted much scholarly 
attention (see, inter alia, O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Malloy 
and Seligson 1987; Baloyra 1987; Needler 1987). Although this new body of 
work has considerable value, it offers no sound theoretical basis for judging the 
survival prospects of newly democratic regimes. Scholars have focused primar-
ily on the antecedents and processes of democratic transitions and have avoided 
the task of prediction. Thus, comparative political sociology today is not much 
closer to a workable theory of stable democracy than it was in the 1960s and 
1970s when many putatively stable democracies fell to a wave of authoritarian 
regimes, a wave which was also unanticipated theoretically (see Linz and Ste-
pan 1978; Collier 1980).  
In thinking about the determinants of stable democracies, however, scholars 
have made a promising shift in causal focus away from social structural and 
toward political determinants conceptualized in terms of the behavior of power-
ful actors or elites. This new emphasis has in turn introduced a large element of 
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indeterminacy. Some scholars now suggest that democratic transitions and 
break-downs are ultimately the products of historically contingent elite choices 
(e.g., O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy 1987). Al-
though this shift in causal focus is a step forward, it may lead to a dead end if it 
is not substantially elaborated. The elite concept is fraught with problems, and 
the contingent nature of elite choices may be a barrier to theoretical progress.  
We suggest a route out of these and related difficulties. Briefly, we argue 
that democratic transitions and breakdowns can best be understood by studying 
basic continuities and changes in the internal relations of national elites. A 
disunified national elite, which is the most common type, produces a series of 
unstable regimes that tend to oscillate between authoritarian and democratic 
forms over varying intervals. A consensually unified national elite, which is 
historically much rarer, produces a stable regime that may evolve into a mod-
ern democracy, as in Sweden, or Britain, or the United States, if economic and 
other facilitative conditions permit. Unless regime changes are preceded or 
accompanied by elite transformations – from disunity to consensual unity, in 
cases of democratic transitions, or from consensual unity to disunity, in cases 
of democratic breakdowns – they should be regarded as strictly temporary. 
However, such elite trans-formations rarely occur. Once created, each national 
elite type strongly tends to persist, with the disunified type being nearly ubi-
quitous, both historically in Europe and Latin America and today among Latin 
American and non-Western countries. Consequently, most regime changes that 
have been examined as democratic transitions or breakdowns are more fruitful-
ly viewed as underpinned by continuing elite disunity and associated regime 
instability. Failure to see this has led many scholars to exaggerate the longer-
term significance of such transitions and break-downs and has left them unpre-
pared to explain the reversals in regime form that typically follow. 
The thrust of our argument is not new. Many scholars have shown that the 
unity of national elites is one of the most important determinants of regime 
forms (e.g., Pareto 1935; Mosca 1939; Aron 1950; Castles 1974; Putnam 1976; 
Huntington 1984). But this idea has not been developed systematically. Disuni-
fied and consensually unified national elites are not well defined, their origins 
and persistence are largely unexamined, and the consequences of their internal 
organization for regime forms are poorly understood. 
The following section outlines a theoretical perspective that begins to cor-
rect these problems. Then our theoretical claims about the connections between 
national elite unity and regime stability are examined in a review of major 
Western political changes that have occurred since about 1500. We demon-
strate that the connection between elite disunity and regime instability has been 
more widespread and persistent in historical and contemporary nation-states 
than is commonly recognized. We conclude by considering how our analysis 
informs current discussions about democratic transitions and breakdowns. 
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Conceptualizing Elite Variations  
and Regime Consequences 
We first specify our frame of reference and organizing concepts. The unit of 
analysis is the independent, territorially consolidated nation-state, a political 
entity that is at least moderately demarcated territorially and administratively 
centralized on basic matters like policing and taxing (see Giddens 1987, pp. 
116-21). Our principal interest is to explain how domestic elite interrelations 
affect regime stability. Although we recognize that elite-regime relationships 
are sometimes changed fundamentally by wars, we do not intend to explain 
such events. And while the political importance of location in the world econ-
omy is undeniable, we think that international economic forces do not normally 
determine elite-regime relationships (see Brenner 1977; Smith 1979; Linz and 
Stepan 1978; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Malloy 1987). Finally, we recog-
nize that subnational, regionally-based ethnic, religious, linguistic, and other 
cultural conflicts sometimes override elite-regime relationships and require 
different but not necessarily contradictory concepts and models (e.g., Lijphart 
1977). 
Within this frame of reference, we conceive of national elites as persons 
who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organiza-
tions and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes 
regularly and substantially (Burton and Higley 1987a). Scholars generally 
agree that national elites can be defined as top position-holders in the largest or 
most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, 
communications, and cultural organizations and movements in a society (see 
Putnam 1976; Higley and Moore 1981; McDonough 1981; Dye 1983; Hoff-
mann-Lange 1987; Moyser and Wagstaffe 1987). We think of regimes as basic 
patterns in the organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-
making power. Many distinctions among regime types can be drawn (e.g., 
democratic, authoritarian, and totalitarian), but we stress the value of distin-
guishing between stable and unstable regimes. 
Scholars who focus on the variability of national elites generally distinguish 
three basic types: (1) the “pluralistic” or “consensually unified” type that exists 
in most Western societies today and that existed in a few of them in earlier 
times; (2) the “totalitarian” or “ideologically unified” type in nation-states 
organized along communist, fascist, or theocratic lines; and (3) the “divided” or 
“disunified” elite of many past and contemporary nation-states (Aron 1950; 
Dahrendorf 1967; Putnam 1976; Welsh 1979; Burton and Higley 1987a). We 
focus here only on consensually unified and disunified national elites because 
understanding their differences and their strong tendency to persist clarifies the 
analysis of democratic transitions and breakdowns. 
A national elite is consensually unified when its members (1) share a largely 
tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to a “re-
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strained partisanship” (Prewitt and Stone 1973; Di Palma 1973), and (2) par-
ticipate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction 
that provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other 
and to the most central decision-makers (Kadushin 1979; Higley and Moore 
1981). This combination of tacit consensus on rules of the game and compre-
hensive integration disposes elite members to view decisional outcomes as a 
positive-sum or “politics-as-bargaining” game, rather than a zero-sum or “poli-
tics-as-war” game (Sartori 1987, p. 224). With agreement on the rules of the 
political game and with decision-making access assured, the diverse and het-
erogeneous members accept various decisions they do not especially like be-
cause they expect to get their way on other issues they consider vital. Over 
time, most elites achieve their most basic aims and are therefore inclined to 
view the totality of decisional outcomes as positive-sum (Sartori 1987, p. 229). 
This explains why elite persons and factions who regularly take opposing 
ideological and policy positions in public consistently refrain from pushing 
their differences to the point of violent conflict. Typical elite members there-
fore enjoy considerable personal security, in the sense that they do not expect 
to be killed, imprisoned, or otherwise severely penalized for ending up on the 
losing side of a policy dispute. It follows that, once this type of national elite is 
created, and so long as it persists, forcible seizures of government power by 
one or another discontented faction will not occur. Moreover, to accommodate 
and process the diverse, frequently opposing interests of the factions in such a 
national elite, political institutions will be structured along representative, at 
least proto-democratic lines, though the actual extent of representative democ-
racy may depend on other, facilitative conditions. 
By contrast, a national elite is disunified when its members (1) share few or 
no understandings about the proprieties of political conduct and (2) engage in 
only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectoral boundaries. 
The basic situation of persons composing this elite type is one of deep insecu-
rity – the fear, usually rooted in experience, that all is lost if some other person 
or faction gets the upper hand. Accordingly, members of a disunified elite 
routinely take extreme measures to protect themselves and their interests: kill-
ing, imprisoning, or banishing opponents, fomenting rebellions against ascen-
dant factions, expropriating opponents’ resources, and so on. In the context of 
elite disunity, these actions are often the most rational ones available. Recent 
experiences of having punitive measures taken against them or their close 
associates, and the strong belief that such measures will be implemented in the 
future, solidify the fears and insecurities of disunified national elite members. 
So entrenched are these fears and insecurities that elite disunity can be tran-
scended only in extraordinary circumstances. 
We have few direct and comprehensive empirical studies of disunified na-
tional elites. Members seldom cooperate in such research because they fear it 
will be used against them. Researchers who persist in studying a disunified 
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elite do so at considerable personal peril. One direct and relatively extensive 
study is McDonough’s (1981) 1972-73 survey of the Brazilian national elite, 
minus the governmentally dominant military elite, which refused to cooperate. 
McDonough’s research portrays an elite divided into military-governmental, 
economic, church, and urban labor factions that were polarized over rules of 
the political game (e.g., freedom of political opposition and the extent of ex-
ecutive power) and isolated from each other. Brown’s (1969, p. 441) more 
limited survey of French elite groups in the mid-1960s – just a few years after 
their conflicts toppled the Fourth Republic and the Algerian imbroglio spawned 
considerable intra-elite violence – concluded that the outstanding feature of the 
French national elite was “the lack of agreement concerning the basic political 
institutions of the nation” and an absence of extensive personal contacts among 
the main elite factions (p. 441). In related fashion, Schonfeld’s (1981) study of 
French elites in the early 1970s found extensive personal ties among elite 
members in the main factions but lack of ties across factional lines. Impor-
tantly, each faction was ignorant of and disregarded the other. In the same vein, 
in Czudnowski’s (1987) limited survey of the Taiwanese national elite, the fact 
that he had to devise complex research stratagems to circumvent the respon-
dents’ mutual fears and hostilities points to basic elite disunity. 
The origin of national elite disunity apparently lies in the process of nation-
state formation. Constructing nation-states out of previously disparate and 
partially autonomous territories is typically such a violent and conflict-ridden 
process, involving the repression of some elite groups by others, that deep and 
unremitting elite disunity is almost inevitable (Coleman 1971, pp. 89-93). 
Bendix’s (1978) treatise on nation-state formation in the West and Japan amply 
demonstrates that nation-state consolidation everywhere resulted in disunified 
elites. The formation of nation-states in Latin America after emancipation from 
Spanish rule in the early 19th century required repeated efforts to suppress 
local elites by force (Oszlak 1981). Johnson (1983) provides a graphic account 
of the altogether similar result of postcolonial nation-state consolidations in 
Black Africa and many other newly emerging nations in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Thus, the historical record strongly suggests that elite disunity originates in 
the formation of nation-states. Disunity is, in other words, the generic condition 
of national elites. But there are two kinds of exceptions. First, the experience of 
operating “home rule” regimes over longer periods under relatively benign 
colonial tutelage and/or of orchestrating large and politically complex national 
independence movements sometimes results in a consensually unified national 
elite from the date of postcolonial independence. The United States, Canada, 
New Zealand, Australia, India, and a few other offshoots of the British Empire 
are the principal examples. Second, defeat and occupation of societies after 
wars sometimes results in consensually unified elites from the date of postwar 
independence because the previously most antagonistic elite factions have been 
liquidated (e.g., Austria during and after World War II). But with these excep-
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tions, the historical record strongly supports the proposition that nation-state 
formation almost always results in a disunified national elite. 
The main political consequence of elite disunity is regime instability. As a 
property of regimes, instability has several meanings. Sanders (1981) identifies 
three meanings: (1) a high incidence of political violence in the form of revolts, 
riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions; (2) frequent changes 
in the makeup of governing coalitions and cabinets; (3) the occurrence of coups 
d’etat or other government overthrows. In our view, the first two meanings are 
not sufficiently discriminating because nearly all regimes at various times 
would qualify as unstable in one or both respects. Only the third meaning, 
suitably elaborated, distinguishes unstable regimes in a clear-cut and theoreti-
cally useful fashion. Thus, a political regime may be said to be unstable when-
ever government executive power is subject to irregular seizures, attempted 
seizures, or widely expected seizures by force. Concrete indicators of regime 
instability are revolutions, uprisings, or coups d’etat aimed at changing the 
control of government executive offices and not orchestrated primarily by 
another nation-state. A regime may be classified as unstable during periods 
when such seizures occur, are attempted, or are regarded by informed persons 
as likely possibilities. So long as any of these indicators of instability obtain, a 
regime’s current mode of functioning, whether “democratic” or “authoritarian” 
or something else, is likely to be temporary. 
Irregular, forcible power seizures are sufficiently frequent and visible, or the 
expectation of them is so palpable, that observers usually have little difficulty 
recognizing a regime as unstable. Thus, Malloy (1985, p. 367) calculated that 
some 186 irregular seizures of government occurred in Bolivia since independ-
ence in 1825. Veliz (1967, p. 278) counted 80 successful military coups in 18 
Latin American countries between 1920 and 1966. Grundy (1968) found 64 
irregular seizures of power in Black African nations between 1963 and 1968, 
and Macridis (1986, p. 225) listed 26 coups in 16 countries of Tropical Africa 
between 1970-1984. Similarly, it is usually not hard to discern expectations of 
irregular power seizures among informed observers of a regime. For example, a 
journalist (Bonner 1988) who recently spent several months talking with lead-
ers and opponents of the democratic regime led by Alan Garcia in Peru con-
cluded: “The soldiers still exercise a de facto veto over the actions of civilians, 
and many observers in Peru, both Peruvian and foreign, think that the question 
is not whether the military will stage a coup but when. Between two and five 
years is the general estimate” (p. 58). 
Occasionally, however, there are regimes in which no irregular power sei-
zure or attempted seizure has recently occurred and in which the likely possi-
bility of such seizures is debatable among informed observers. Uruguay, after 
its civil war in 1904 and through the years immediately preceding the military 
coup in 1973, is an example. Chile, after the overthrow of the Ibanez dictator-
ship in 1932 and down to the first year of the Allende government in 1970-71, 
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is another example. France during the long-lasting Third Republic, 1875-1940, 
might be another. In such ambiguous cases, many scholars and policy-makers 
have mistakenly regarded regimes as stable. 
The primary reason for these inaccurate assessments has been a failure to 
comprehend the underlying condition of elite disunity. Although elites and 
regimes seem inextricably entwined, analytically distinguishing between the 
basic structure of a national elite and the characteristics of its political regime 
allows one to postulate a causal relationship between elites and regimes, in 
which elite structure is viewed as logically and factually prior to regime stabil-
ity. This leads to the proposition that, for a lasting democratic transition to 
occur, the national elite must first be transformed from disunity to consensual 
unity. When analyzing regime changes, in short, researchers should concentrate 
on the underlying elite structure, seeking recent or historical evidence of an 
elite transformation. If no such evidence is found, the analyst should presume 
that the elite remains disunified and the regime remains unstable. 
This conclusion presumes that we know both what elite transformations 
from disunity to consensual unity look like and the circumstances in which they 
may occur. Unfortunately, political sociologists have not explored these mat-
ters in depth. We (Burton and Higley 1987b) recently analyzed one kind of 
elite transformation: the “elite settlement” in which warring elite factions sud-
denly and deliberately reorganized their relations by negotiating compromises 
on their most basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and 
laying the basis for a stable democratic regime. The elite settlement process is 
exemplified by political events in England in 1688-89, Sweden in 1808-9, and 
Colombia and Venezuela in the late 1950s. We suspect that a second kind of 
transformation from disunity to consensual unity occurs in two distinct steps. In 
step one, some of the warring factions enter into sustained, peaceful collabora-
tion in electoral politics in order to mobilize a reliable electoral majority, win 
elections repeatedly, and thereby protect their interests by dominating govern-
ment executive power. In step two, the major hostile factions opposing this 
coalition eventually tire of losing elections and, seeing no other way to gain 
government power (for example, through a coup), gradually abandon their 
distinct ideological and policy stances and adopt essentially those of the win-
ning coalition. With this development, a consensually unified national elite is 
created and a stable democratic regime rapidly emerges. Examples include 
France and Italy during the past quarter century: center-right elite coalitions 
formed, the French Gaullists and the Italian Christian Democrats plus smaller 
elite factions in each country. These coalitions then dominated electoral politics 
in ways that eventually forced radical leftist factions, principally the French 
Socialists and the Italian Communists, to moderate their ideologies and pro-
grams in order to compete effectively for executive office (Field and Higley 
1978). 
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So far as we can determine, elite settlements and these “two-step” elite 
transformations are, to date in modern history, the only routes from a disunified 
to a consensually unified national elite. They thus constitute the only indige-
nous bases for changes from unstable to stable democratic (or proto-
democratic) regimes. But, as noted, such transformations rarely occur. Con-
versely, elite transformations from consensual unity to disunity are even rarer. 
Down to the present period at least, consensually unified national elites, once 
formed, have everywhere perpetuated themselves. 
The rarity of elite transformations from consensual unity to disunity has im-
plications for the analysis of democratic breakdowns. The much-discussed 
breakdowns of interwar Europe (see Linz and Stepan 1978) all occurred in 
nation-states whose elites had been patently disunified since the time of nation-
state formation (e.g., German elites after 1871; see Baum 1981; Hamilton 
1982). What broke down in interwar Europe were democratic interludes in 
wider patterns of elite disunity and regime instability. Possibly, an elite trans-
formation from consensual unity to disunity, and thus a regime change from 
stability to instability, have recently occurred in the Philippines, a nation-state 
that gave many indications of having a consensually unified national elite and a 
stable democratic regime from the end of American colonial tutelage in 1946 
until the spread of intraelite violence, culminating in several military rebellions, 
during the 1980s. 
Although elite transformations are fundamentally “elite events,” mass vari-
ables obviously are important. Elites always need mass support. Mass condi-
tions and orientations thus establish fields of opportunity and constraint to 
which elites must respond (see Field and Higley 1980, pp. 18-47). For example, 
two-step elite transformations appear possible only where a majority of voters 
are disposed, by virtue of their socioeconomic and other conditions, to support 
elite electoral appeals that essentially defend the status quo. Yet, as we suggest 
below, no discernible mass configuration leads inexorably to elite transforma-
tions. Despite dramatic changes in mass conditions and orientations during the 
modern historical period, the modal pattern of Western politics was one of 
persistent elite disunity and resulting regime instability. We now briefly de-
scribe this modal pattern. 
The Model Pattern of Western Politics 
For most of the period between 1500 and the Napoleonic Wars, only eight 
Western societies approached the political independence and integration of 
modern nation-states: Denmark, England, France, Portugal, Russia, Scotland, 
Spain, and Sweden (see Table 1). During the first half of this period probably 
only England fully met the nation-state standard in terms of territorial political 
consolidation. Denmark was embroiled in an effort to retain control of Sweden, 
France was periodically broken up in civil wars over religious and social ques-
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tions until late in the 17th century, Portugal was subjugated by Spain between 
1580 and 1640, Russia did not achieve national consolidation until the 17th 
century under the Romanovs, Scotland was not fully independent from England 
after 1650 and it disappeared as a nation-state after merging with England in 
1707, and Spain was initially several distinct countries joined by a dynastic 
union that only eventually led to territorial demarcation and administrative 
centralization. A ninth political entity, the United Provinces of the Netherlands, 
threw off Spanish domination in the 1580s, but the seven provinces, which 
separately appeared to have consensually unified elites from the time of inde-
pendence (see Grever 1982), did not achieve nation-state consolidation until 
the Napoleonic Wars. Throughout the 18th century, Brandenburg-Prussia 
emerged as an important European power, but it consisted of various semiau-
tonomous and noncontiguous territories. Finally, the United States did not 
emerge as a consolidated nation-state until the very end of the period. 
Tab. 1: Types and Origins of National Elites in  
Selected Western Nation-States: A Schematic View  
(CU = Consensually Unified; DU = Disunified; IU = Ideologically Unified) 
Nation-State Formation Elite Type(s) Origin of CU Elite 
England (late medieval) DU to 1689 
CU 1689-1988 
Elite settlement 
1688-1689 
Denmark (late medieval) DU to 1901 
CU 1935-88 
2-step transformation 
1901-35 
Scotland (late medieval) DU to 1707 None; merged w/England 1707 
Portugal (late medieval) DU to 1980s None clearly indicated 
Spain (from 16th cent.) DU to 1977 
CU 1979-88 
Elite settlement 
1977-79 
Sweden (from 16th cent.) DU to 1809 
CU 1809-1988 
Elite settlement 
1808-9 
Russia (from 17th cent.) DU to 1917 
IU 1921-88 
None; revolutionary transformation. 
1917-21 
France (late 17th cent.) DU to 1960 
CU 1981-88 
2-step transformation 
1960-81 
U.S.A. (from 1789) CU 1789-1988 Colonial “home rule” and independence struggle 
Netherlands (from 1813) CU 1813-1988 Fusion of provincial elites 
Prussia (from 1815 or earlier) DU to 1871 None; merged w/Germany 1871 
Belgium (from 1830) DU to 1890s 
CU 1961-1988 
2-step transformation 
1900-61 
Switzerland (from 1848) CU 1848-1988 Fusion of cantonal elites 
Italy (from 1870) DU to 1948 
CU 1980-88 
2-step transformation 1948-80 
Germany (from 1871) DU to 1933 
IU 1933-45 
CU 1966-88 
Revolutionary transformation 1933 
2-step transformation 1948-66 
Norway (from 1884) CU 1935-88 2-step transformation 1884-1935 
Austria (from 1919 or earlier) DU to 1938 
CU 1948-88 
Elite settlement 1945-48 
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Disunity as the Generic Condition of National Elites  
By about 1600 all eight original societies-cum-nation-states had reached levels 
of urbanization and commercialization sufficiently complex that many elite 
positions required more or less full-time attention by their incumbents. Al-
though small leisured classes of influential aristocrats and gentry continued to 
exist, in showdown situations the decisive power-wielders tended to be the 
persons and factions commanding the most important bureaucratic organiza-
tions: monarchs and high state officials, senior military officers, high-ranking 
ecclesiastics, merchants and entrepreneurs heading important commercial en-
terprises, and leaders of regional political bodies. 
As national aggregations, these elites were clearly disunified in the sense 
that wide and deep struggles for political ascendancy typified their relation-
ships. Elite factions associated with monarchs and contenders for the throne 
tended to back royal absolutism, while factions benefiting from local autonomy 
resisted. The use of military force for purposes of aggrandizement and pacifica-
tion bulked large (Finer 1975; Mann 1986), and religious divisions made strug-
gles between state-building and state-resisting elites more bitter and complex 
(Bendix 1978; see also Tilly 1975). 
Political regimes in all these nation-states were traditional monarchies in 
which government executive power was transferred among successive rulers by 
principles of inheritance. But since there seldom was any widespread agree-
ment on the concrete application of these principles, transfers of executive 
power were subject to intrigues, challenges, and usurpations. In Denmark, for 
example, struggle over the royal succession exploded in civil war during the 
1530s, and in England succession to the throne was precarious throughout the 
second half of the 16th century. Even where transfers of executive power 
among successive monarchs occurred peacefully – as during Spain’s “golden” 
16th century – the mutual fear and distrust of elite factions guaranteed inces-
sant rivalries, plots, and other frequently violent maneuvers aimed at dominat-
ing the monarch. 
In reality, these traditional monarchies simply embodied elite disunity. The 
attempt to centralize political power in one person and clique – the monarch 
and his or her retinue – reflected the absence of mutually agreed power-sharing 
arrangements. In Bendix’s (1978, pp. 218-43) view, traditional monarchies 
confronted insoluble dilemmas-irreconcilable needs to both concentrate and 
delegate royal authority, large and irreducible elements of arbitrariness in mon-
archical actions, eminently disputable processes of inheritance and succession, 
pervasive uncertainty about the extent and limits of royal authority-the only 
consequence of which could be regime instability. In these fundamental re-
spects, the persistence of traditional monarchies everywhere testified to the 
existence of disunified national elites. 
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The First Elite Settlements 
Down to the Napoleonic Wars, the relationship between elite disunity and 
regime instability was broken only in England and Sweden (see Table 1). In 
England’s “Glorious Revolution” of 1688-89, and in substantively similar 
events surrounding Sweden’s creation of a constitutional monarchy in 1808-9, 
elite settlements occurred in which previously warring factions suddenly and 
deliberately transformed their relations from disunity to consensual unity. As 
we have argued (Burton and Higley 1987b), these settlements originated in the 
recent experience of costly but inconclusive elite conflict – the English civil 
wars and their Cromwellian aftermath plus 30 years of bitter infighting be-
tween Tory and Whig factions during the Restoration period, and in Sweden 
the struggle between Hat and Cap factions throughout the 18th century. Imme-
diate precipitants were dramatic political crises: the birth of James II’s son in 
1688, making probable a Catholic succession to the throne of a Protestant 
country; the grave defeat Sweden suffered at the hands of Russia in 1808, cou-
pled with economic disarray. The settlements depended for their success upon 
the unprecedented forbearance and secret collusions of a handful of skilled and 
experienced leaders, representing the major elite factions, who rapidly negoti-
ated compromises on the most dangerous issues. And the predominantly un-
mobilized character of non-elite populations apparently facilitated the settle-
ments by allowing elites sufficient autonomy to negotiate compromises. 
These settlements established new arrangements for sharing power, thereby 
greatly reducing elite insecurities. Henceforth, most elite persons had reliable 
access to decision-making on issues salient to them, and defeats on policy 
questions no longer carried drastic penalties. Almost immediately after the 
English and Swedish elite settlements, a prudent and restrained politics came 
into being, with contested elections taking place at short intervals and eventu-
ally becoming democratized through universal suffrage, and with executive 
power shifting from monarchs to cabinets responsible to elected bodies. There-
after, even serious political challenges, such as England’s Chartist Movement 
during the 1830s and radical labor movements in both countries at the end of 
the 19th century, did not prevent the peaceful transfer of executive power 
among different elite factions according to the outcomes of regular popular 
elections. 
We sketch the elite settlements in England and Sweden because they repre-
sent, within the frame of reference specified, the only route in preindustrial 
societies from elite disunity and regime instability to consensual elite unity and 
a stable, proto-democratic political regime. Without a settlement, the elite 
disunity that originates during nation-state formation simply persists, guaran-
teeing that political regimes remain unstable. This contention is borne out by 
the politics of the other original Western nation-states down to the Napoleonic 
Wars: in none did anything resembling the English and Swedish elite settle-
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ments occur, and all of their political regimes evidenced instability throughout 
the period. 
Persistence of Elite Disunity Elsewhere 
In Denmark, struggles among aristocratic and bourgeois elite factions culmi-
nated in royal absolutism after 1665. A century of rule by a few hundred lan-
downers in league with the monarchy followed but was upset in the 1770s and 
1780s by palace intrigues and power grabs, amounting to successive coups 
d’etat. In France during the 17th and 18th centuries, elites in the court, the 
church, the military, and the major towns became polarized over traditional and 
rationalist views of rank and privilege and over other opposing conceptions of 
the good society. The chasm between the elite camps persisted, and in 1788-89 
revolution broke out. In Portugal, independence from Spain in 1640 was soon 
followed by court intrigues, the overthrow of Alfonso VI in 1668, and the 
assertion of royal absolutism, which, as elsewhere, involved constant infighting 
among elite factions bent on dominating the monarchical power. 
Elite disunity was also evident in Russia and Spain. In Russia during the 
17th century, absolutist rule was punctuated by sporadic uprisings which the 
Tsars ruthlessly suppressed. After 35 years of “enlightened despotism” under 
Peter The Great (1689-1725), court intrigues and military interventions per-
petuated regime instability. As Bendix (1978, p. 597) notes, only two of the 
eight monarchs following Peter during the 18th century attained the throne 
without military intervention, and both were murdered. Spanish politics in the 
17th century were dominated first by revolts against Castilian hegemony and 
then by attempts by noble elite factions to dominate the incompetent Charles 11 
(1665-1700). Early in the 18th century, Spain broke up in civil war and re-
gional revolts. It was patched together in 1716, but its politics then paralleled 
French politics – a protracted struggle pitting reactionary aristocrats and church 
officials against modernizing elite factions spearheaded by state officials and 
leaders of the small bourgeoisie. At century’s end, under another incompetent 
king, Charles IV, court intrigues swept Spain into its disastrous French alliance, 
which produced an uprising against the king, his forced abdication in 1808, and 
Napoleon’s imposition of his brother Joseph on the Spanish throne. 
In short, the uniform political pattern in all of the earliest Western nation-
states was elite disunity and regime instability, a pattern originating in the 
process of nation-state formation. Except in England and Sweden, where ex-
traordinary circumstances facilitated sudden and deliberate settlements, elite 
disunity and regime instability persisted over several hundred years, despite the 
ebb and flow of national fortunes and despite fairly steady socioeconomic 
development. This pattern was not simply a consequence of imperfect nation-
state consolidation, traditional monarchies, or preindustrialization. It persisted 
after these nation-states fully consolidated, after their monarchies were mostly 
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replaced by republican governments, real or de facto, and after their economies 
were substantially industrialized. 
Elite Disunity in the 19th Century 
Conquests by French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies turned many small 
and precariously independent German and Italian principalities into large terri-
torial units. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna ratified these changes, thus reor-
ganizing the European political map (see Table 1). Prussia emerged as a major 
nation-state, while the loosely consolidated Habsburg Empire (after 1867 the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire) tried to control territories in Italy, Eastern Europe, 
and the Balkans. As a result of war in the 1860s, Prussia excluded the Habs-
burg Empire from German-speaking territories outside Austria proper, and in 
1871 Prussia established the German Reich. With French and Prussian help, the 
Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont expanded, also reducing the Habsburg Empire, 
and emerged in 1870 as the Italian nation-state. Along with France, Spain, and 
Russia, these countries dominated continental Europe, though smaller nation-
states also emerged – the Netherlands from 1813, Belgium from 1830, Switzer-
land from 1848, Norway from 1884. 
At various points during the 19th century, most of these countries, along 
with Britain, Sweden, and Denmark, reached industrial levels of socioeconomic 
development, and their populations came to include large categories of manual 
industrial, bureaucratic, and service workers. This spread of an industrial occu-
pational configuration created new elites commanding labor unions, mass po-
litical parties, new commercial enterprises, professional associations, mass 
media organizations, educational institutions, and public sector agencies and 
organizations stemming from state expansion. But industrialization was not 
accompanied by any basic change in elite structures or in the character of po-
litical regimes. Elites in the original European nation-states, other than England 
and Sweden, remained disunified. If anything, elite disunity was exacerbated 
by the French Revolution’s aftershocks, by new elites entering the political 
arena, and by conflicts between population segments resulting from industriali-
zation. Moreover, the process of forging new nation-states during the 19th 
century nearly everywhere produced disunified national elites. Thus, in Prussia, 
Belgium, Germany after 1871, and Italy after 1870, elites disagreed fundamen-
tally about the constitutions and institutions on which their new nations rested, 
and they defended or subverted governments according to their narrow inter-
ests. 
Two exceptions, Switzerland and Norway, require brief mention. Before en-
tering the new Swiss federation in 1848, several, perhaps all, previously self-
governing, geographically isolated Swiss cantons had consensually unified 
elites as outgrowths of late medieval “citizen communities.” The Swiss consti-
tutional settlement of 1848 formed these cantonal elites into a consensually 
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unified national elite that has operated a stable representative regime ever 
since. Somewhat by contrast, Norway was controlled by Sweden between 1814 
and 1884, with Norwegian elites operating a “home rule” regime along repre-
sentative political lines. When Sweden relinquished control in 1884, Norway 
emerged with a national elite that was halfway through a two-step transforma-
tion. Between them, conservative and liberal factions mobilized an electoral 
majority and consistently excluded ostensibly revolutionary socialist factions 
from government executive power until the latter abandoned radicalism during 
the 1930s, allowing full consensual unification (see Higley, Field, and Groholt 
1976). 
But elsewhere in 19th century Europe, elite disunity persisted and produced 
frequent, often violent oscillations in regime forms. Thus, in France a tradi-
tional monarchy was restored in 1814-15, a “bourgeois monarchy” was in-
stalled in an upheaval in 1830, a republican regime was instituted by revolt in 
1848, an autocratic regime was established by coup d’etat in 1851, and another 
republican regime was instituted following the suppression of the Paris Com-
mune uprising of 1870. Elite disunity and regime instability were equally con-
spicuous in Spain: restoration of the monarchy in 1814; enforced liberalization 
of the monarchy, involving a military coup, between 1820 and 1823; the mili-
tary-backed “succession” of three-year-old Queen Isabel III in 1833 and with-
drawal of the former heir presumptive to lead a “Carlist” revolt in the north; 
military interventions that shifted power between liberal and conservative 
factions in 1835, 1843, 1854, and 1856; Isabel’s dethronement in 1868 and an 
interregnum of military rule and civil war followed by her son’s acceptance of 
a constitutional monarchy with nominally representative institutions in 1875. 
Portugal experienced a similar pattern of upheavals: displacement of the mon-
archy in 1820, a failed insurrection in 1824, civil war in 1832-34, coups in 
1836 and 1851, and an attempted uprising in 1890. 
In most other European nation-states, however, there were no similar se-
quences of government overthrows. In Russia, Prussia, and Germany, conser-
vative elite factions used repression to sustain monarchies that were reviled by 
elites leading bourgeois and working-class organizations and movements. In 
these countries, and in Denmark, Belgium, and Italy, elite disunity was sug-
gested by deep ideological divisions between elites, and regime instability was 
reflected in intrigues surrounding the monarchical regimes and in numerous 
riots, strikes, and other confrontations engineered by dissident elites. 
Disunified Elites and Unstable Democracies 
When the 19th century ended, all Western nation-states except Russia had 
representative political institutions involving significant practice of electoral 
politics. The material wealth produced by industrialization enabled dominant 
elites temporarily to placate dissident elites and their followings, and the suf-
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frage was still largely restricted to those with a stake in the existing socioeco-
nomic order. Thus, elections did not immediately become merely another way 
for warring factions to undermine and destroy each other. For a while, a num-
ber of European nation-states appeared to have stable democratic regimes, even 
though no basic elite transformation had occurred. 
We must examine this situation further because it bears directly on our ar-
gument that democracy is stable only when elites are consensually unified. The 
long-lasting French Third Republic may seem to constitute a particularly clear 
exception. For 65 years it suffered no forcible seizure of government executive 
power, and it was regarded as one of the major democracies of the modern age. 
If space allowed, other seeming exceptions to our argument would bear exami-
nation: Italy’s constitutional monarchy from 1870 until Mussolini’s takeover in 
1922-25; and, further afield, the Argentine regime between 1912 and 1930, the 
Uruguayan regime between 1905 and the late 1960s, and the Chilean regime 
between 1933 and Allende’s assumption of the presidency in 1970. In our view 
such governments were interludes, if rather long-lasting ones, in a continuing 
pattern of elite disunity and regime instability. Here we can only illustrate this 
interpretation by looking at the French Third Republic. 
Despite certain conditions favoring an elite transformation, the creation of 
the Third Republic was not preceded, accompanied, or followed by unification 
of the disunified elites so evident in France’s earlier history. Among the mo-
narchist factions who held a majority of National Assembly seats in the early 
1870s, many people favored a British-style constitutional monarchy (Anderson 
1977, p. 6). Republicans within the Assembly were predominantly moderate, as 
exemplified by their leader, Adolphe Thiers. Monarchists and republicans were 
thus potentially capable of compromising. And radical factions in the Assem-
bly were in disarray after the Paris Commune debacle. In these circumstances, 
an elite settlement was conceivable. A step in this direction was the “fusionist” 
effort by leaders of the two monarchist factions to have the Legitimist pretend-
er, the childless Comte de Chambord, then in his fifties, take the throne and be 
succeeded by the much younger Orleanist pretender, the Comte de Paris 
(Thomson 1969, pp. 80-83). The plan foundered on Chambord’s refusal of the 
limited monarchy being offered, a refusal he couched in a dispute over the 
national flag. Had Chambord accepted the fusionist plan, it might have become 
a key element in a comprehensive elite settlement. 
Thus, the Third Republic was born, not in an elite settlement but in an elite 
stalemate (Hoffmann 1963). Established by a one-vote margin in the National 
Assembly in 1875, it was never viewed by monarchist, Bonapartist, or left-
wing elite factions as more than a temporary expedient (Thomson 1969). These 
several factions mobilized major segments of the business class, the church 
hierarchy, the military, the civil service, and the working class. Predictably, 
expectations of forcible seizures of government power became a regular feature 
of French politics. During the 1880s there was considerable support for a coup 
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by ex-General Boulanger, but he balked at the last minute. The Ligue des Pa-
triotes attempted a coup in 1889. In 1898 and 1899, during the divisive Dreyfus 
affair, two serious coup plots were uncovered. In 1933, Action Francaise and 
other protofascist groups conspired to overthrow the Daladier government. The 
last years of the Republic, before, during, and after the Popular Front govern-
ment of 1936-1938, involved severe elite disunity, as evidenced by the alacrity 
with which a major portion of the elite seized the opportunity created by mili-
tary defeat in 1940 to dismantle the Republic and to establish the corporatist, 
semifascist Vichy regime (Paxton 1972). 
Similar analyses of continuing elite disunity and its destabilizing effects on 
democratic regimes apply to most other European and all Latin American na-
tion-states during the latter part of the 19th century and much of this century. 
Weimar Germany and the Austrian Republic during the interwar period before 
Hitler took over provide two especially clear-cut and consequential examples 
(see Hamilton 1982), but so do Italy, Spain, and Portugal in the same period. 
Did this modal pattern of Western politics persist after World War II? Fol-
lowing our argument, one must examine each country for clear evidence of an 
elite transformation from disunity to consensual unity, through either a sudden 
and deliberate settlement or a two-step transformation. Apart from Russia and 
its East European satellites, and possibly Portugal, all the unstable European 
countries discussed above appear to have experienced an elite transformation 
(see Table 1). In Austria, the proporz system and other power-sharing ar-
rangements that elites secretly negotiated in the late 1940s probably constituted 
an elite settlement, thus laying the basis for the first stable democratic regime 
in Austria’s history (see Steiner 1972; Stiefbold 1974). Similarly, the intensive 
elite negotiations carried on in Spain after Franco’s death in 1975 produced a 
settlement terminating more than four centuries of regime instability (see Gun-
ther et al. 1986; Share 1987). Elsewhere – in West Germany and Belgium 
during the 1950s and early 1960s, and in France and Italy during the 1960s and 
1970s – two-step elite transformations occurred as the electoral dominance of 
center-right elite coalitions gradually forced left-wing factions to abandon 
socialist orthodoxies and join their “bourgeois” opponents in defending and 
operating liberal democratic regimes presiding over capitalist economies. 
Summary 
Table 1 summarizes the patterns underlying our contention that, barring special 
colonial legacies such as those in the United States or the Netherlands, and 
barring exceptional historical and geographical circumstances such as those of 
Switzerland, elite disunity and regime instability have been so wide-spread and 
persistent as to constitute the modal pattern of Western politics. Locating the 
origins of elite disunity in the formations of Western nation-states, the table 
illustrates our contention that the relationship between elite disunity and regime 
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instability simply persists, regardless of changes in regime forms or in the 
configurations of mass publics, until one of three elite transformations occurs: 
(1) a sudden and deliberate elite settlement, (2) a more gradual two-step elite 
transformation, or (3) a “revolutionary elite transformation” to the condition of 
ideological unity (which because of our focus we have not examined). Finally, 
Table 1 suggests that only after an elite settlement or a two-step transformation 
do previously unstable regimes become stable along representative lines that 
are conducive to the rapid or gradual spread of democratic politics. In short, 
within the frame of reference specified, special colonial legacies, elite settle-
ments, and two-step elite transformations have constituted the only routes to 
stable democratic political regimes in modem Western history. We now sug-
gest some implications of this analysis for the current discussion of democratic 
transitions and democratic breakdowns. 
Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns Reconsidered 
The distinction between democratic, totalitarian, and authoritarian regimes has 
been a mainstay of comparative political sociology, but success in developing a 
general theory of political continuity and change centering on this distinction 
has been slight. A serious impediment is the fuzziness in distinguishing be-
tween democratic and authoritarian regimes. While Linz (1964, 1975) and 
others have offered sound distinctions between totalitarian and authoritarian 
regimes, so long as the former retained something like their pristine Stalinist 
and Hitlerite forms, the analytical boundary between authoritarian and democ-
ratic regimes has been much less convincingly drawn. This is reflected by the 
numerous concepts that seemingly combine authoritarian and democratic ele-
ments: authoritarian-populist, single-party, revolutionary, mobilizational, tute-
lary, and even post-authoritarian regimes. Moreover, political changes have 
made the analytical dichotomy into a sieve, as numerous countries have oscil-
lated between various authoritarian and democratic regime forms. 
Reacting to these regime oscillations, comparative political sociology has 
developed an oscillatory pattern. Thus, during the 1950s and early 1960s, when 
many newly independent developing countries seemed to be consolidating 
democratic regimes, and when most Latin American countries seemed to be 
moving toward democracy, comparativists were preoccupied with theories 
about the socioeconomic requisites of democratic regimes (e.g., Lipset 1959; 
Cutright 1963), the political cultures in which they are ostensibly rooted (Lipset 
1963; Almond and Verba 1963), and other aspects of political development or 
evolution toward democracy (see Huntington 1968; Huntington and 
Dominguez 1975). Beginning in the mid-1960s, however, the fledgling democ-
ratic regimes of many developing countries were overthrown and replaced by 
authoritarian regimes. During the 1970s, comparativists thus became preoccu-
pied with “democratic breakdowns” (Linz and Stepan 1978), the role of the 
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military in politics (Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1977), and the nature of “bu-
reaucratic-authoritarian” as well as other nondemocratic but also nontotalitarian 
regimes (O’Donnell 1973; Collier 1980). Beginning in the late 1970s, a number 
of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin America and Southern Europe, 
again gave way to more democratic ones. Accordingly scholars are now preoc-
cupied with “democratic transitions” or “transitions from authoritarian rule” 
(O’Donnell et al. 1986; Malloy and Seligson 1987; Needler 1987; Baloyra 
1987). 
We have outlined an approach to the study of regime creation, persistence, 
and change that avoids this oscillatory, reactive pattern. Thus, any tendency to 
accord watershed importance to the latest regime changes in countries with 
long records of instability should be resisted unless compelling evidence dem-
onstrates that the necessary elite transformations have occurred. Studies of 
“democratic breakdowns,” such as those collected by Linz and Stepan (1978), 
provide much evidence of long-standing regime instability rooted in continuing 
elite disunity. But such studies fail to observe that, without some fundamental 
transformation to consensual unity, any outcome other than breakdown was 
and is unlikely. Similarly, discussions of recent transitions from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe generally fail to ask 
whether the regime changes were preceded or accompanied by shifts from elite 
disunity to unity. Again, without such elite transformations, these democratic 
transitions are likely to be short-lived swings in regime instability. 
An important step toward recognizing the significance of elite transforma-
tions is the recent attention paid to “elite pacts.” O’Donnell and Schmitter 
(1986, p. 37) define an elite pact as  
an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a 
select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to re-define) rules govern-
ing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ‘vital inter-
ests’ of those entering into it. 
Such an elite pact roughly approximate sour concept of an elite settlement, 
though the latter is more comprehensive and multifaceted. The importance of 
elite pacts has been noted in the democratic transitions of Colombia in 1957-58 
(Wilde 1978; Hartlyn 1984), Venezuela in 1958 (Karl 1986), and Spain in 
1977-79 (Gunther et al. 1986). O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, pp. 37-39) 
doubt that such pacts are necessary pre-conditions for transition to stable de-
mocracy, but they think pacts enhance its probability. They observe, for exam-
ple, that two of the three countries that escaped the post-1964 wave of demo-
cratic breakdowns in Latin America – Colombia and Venezuela – were “pacted 
democracies.” In our view, the third country, Costa Rica, escaped breakdown 
because in 1948 its elites entered into a settlement, though not a formal pact 
(see Peeler 1985). Moreover, O’Donnell and Schmitter notice that even the 
long-lasting, but “unpacted,” democratic regimes in Chile after 1933 and Uru-
guay after 1904 oscillated to authoritarian forms in 1973. As we have sug-
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gested, those regimes-like the French Third Republic and several other long-
lasting, more or less democratic Western regimes – were unstable because they 
did not originate in fundamental elite transformations from disunity to consen-
sual unity. They rested instead on fragile coalitions and stalemates among 
basically disunified elites, and their comparatively long durations probably 
depended on a good measure of luck. Sooner or later they were likely to break 
down in the face of a political crisis. 
Although the focus on elite pacts and other recent elite-centered analyses are 
steps forward, they introduce a potentially trouble-some amount of indetermi-
nacy. Thus, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 5) stress  
the high degree of indeterminacy embedded in situations where unexpected 
events (fortuna), insufficient information, hurried and audacious choices, con-
fusion about motives and interests, plasticity, and even in definition of politi-
cal identities, as well as the talents of specific individuals (virtu), are fre-
quently decisive in determining the outcomes. 
Like Hamilton’s (1982) penetrating study of the breakdown of democracy in 
Weimar Germany, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986, p. 19) adopt a position of 
“structural indeterminacy” when analyzing recent transitions from authoritarian 
rule. Similarly, Malloy’s (1987, p. 237) analysis of recent regime changes in 
Latin America notes that “there is a key voluntary dimension to the process that 
... precludes neat deterministic theories based on general laws.” 
Our effort to specify the basic forms of national elites, their origins, and 
their consequences provides a way around what may otherwise be a theoretical 
dead end. Although more systematic and explicit in its concepts and claims 
than much current work, our approach nevertheless respects the messiness of 
politics and political history. Our concepts steer a middle course between grand 
theory and a retreat to local history. We urge those who study democratic 
breakdowns and democratic transitions to look first at elites and to investigate 
basic patterns and transformations of elite relationships. This approach is de-
cidedly not monocausal, however. We recognize that religion, class, ethnicity, 
technology, demography, geography, economic development, and the “demon-
stration effects” of other countries’ politics (Bendix 1978) may affect elite 
relationships and the forms of political regimes. But we deny that such forces 
lead inexorably to democratic transitions or breakdowns. Instead, we see na-
tional elites as filtering these forces, with each type of elite giving a broadly 
predictable thrust to the functioning of political regimes. 
Finally, our approach implies much caution about the prospects for stable 
democracy in contemporary developing nations. The strong tendency for dis-
unified elites to persist, evident in the West almost up to the present, and evi-
dent today in most Third-World countries, calls for a shift in thinking about the 
mechanisms through which stable democracies are established. Stable democ-
racies do not emerge simply by writing constitutions, holding elections, ex-
panding human rights, accelerating economic growth, or exterminating leftist 
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insurgencies. The vital step is the consensual unification of previously disuni-
fied elites. Except in a few instances growing out of international warfare, such 
elite transformations have resulted primarily from internal situations and con-
tingencies. This strongly suggests that Western countries can do little to pro-
mote stable democracies where they do not now exist. Indeed, it may be that 
Western policies – in particular those of the United States – have done more 
harm than good, often exacerbating elite disunity and thus actually weakening 
prospects for the elite transformations that alone appear to provide the basis for 
stable democracy. 
References 
Almond, Gabriel A., and Sydney Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton: Prin-
ceton University Press.  
Anderson, R. D. 1977. France 1870-1914: Politics and Society. London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul. 
Aron, Raymond. 1950. Social Structure and Ruling Class. British Journal of Soci-
ology 1: 1-16, 126-43.  
Baloyra, Enrique A., ed. 1987. Comparing New Democracies: Transition and Con-
solidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone. Boulder, CO: West-
view.  
Baum, Rainer C. 1981. The Holocaust and the German Elite: Genocide and Na-
tional Suicide in Germany, 1917-1945. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.  
Bendix, Reinhard. 1978. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berke-
ley: University of California Press.  
Bonner, Raymond. 1988. A Reporter At Large: Peru’s War. New Yorker (4 Janu-
ary): 31-58.  
Brenner, Robert. 1977. The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-
Smithian Marxism. New Left Review 104: 25-92.  
Brown, Bernard E. 1969. Elite Attitudes and Political Legitimacy in France. Jour-
nal of Politics 31: 420-42.  
Burton, Michael G., and John Higley. 1987a. Invitation to Elite Theory. In Power 
Elites and Organizations, ed. G. William Domhoff and Thomas R. Dye, 133-43. 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
1987b. Elite Settlements. American Sociological Review 52: 295-307.  
Castles, Francis G. 1974. Political Stability. Milton Keynes (UK): Open University 
Press.  
Coleman, James S. 1971. The Development Syndrome: Differentiation-Equality-
Capacity. In Crises and Sequences in Political Development, ed. Leonard Binder 
et al, 73-100. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Collier, David, ed. 1980. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.  
Czudnowski, Moshe M. 1987. Interviewing Political Elites in Taiwan. In Research 
Methods for Elite Studies, ed. George Moyser and Margaret Wagstaffe, 232-50. 
London: Allen & Unwin.  
 265 
Cutright, Phillips. 1963. National Political Development: Measurement and Analy-
sis. American Sociological Review 28: 253-64.  
Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1967. Society and Democracy in Germany. Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday.  
Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1973. The Study of Conflict in Western Societies: A Critique of 
the End of Ideology. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.  
Dye, Thomas R. 1983. Who’s Running America? The Reagan Years. 3rd ed. En-
glewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1978. Imperfectly Unified Elites: The Cases of 
Italy and France. In Comparative Studies in Sociology, ed. R. Tomasson, 295-
317. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1980. Elitism. London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
Field, G. Lowell, and John Higley. 1985. National Elites and Political Stability. In 
Research in Politics and Society: Studies of the Structure of National Elite 
Groups, vol. 1, ed. Gwen Moore, 1-44. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
Finer, Samuel E. 1975. State- and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the 
Military. In The Formation of National States in Western Europe, ed. Charles 
Tilly, 83-163. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Giddens, Anthony. 1987. The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Grever, John H. 1982. The Structure of Decision-Making in the States General of 
the Dutch Republic, 1660-68. Parliaments, Estates and Representation 2 (2): 
125-53.  
Grundy, Kenneth W. 1968. Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa. Nairobi: 
East African Publishing House.  
Gunther, Richard, Giacomo Sani, and Goldie Shabad. 1986. Spain After Franco: 
The Making of a Competitive Party System. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Hamilton, Richard. 1982. Who Voted For Hitler? Princeton: Princeton University 
Press.  
Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1984. Military Governments and the Transition to Civilian Rule: 
The Colombian Experience of 1957-1958. Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs 26: 245-81.  
Higley, John, G. Lowell Field, and Knut Groholt. 1976. Elite Structure and Ideolo-
gy. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Higley, John, and Gwen Moore. 1981. Elite Integration in the United States and 
Australia. American Political Science Review 75: 581-97.  
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1963. In Search of France. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press.  
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 1987. Surveying National Elites in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. In Research Methods for Elite Studies, ed. George Moyser and 
Margaret Wagstaffe, 27-47. Boston: Allen and Unwin. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. 1984. Will More Countries Become Democratic? Political 
Science Quarterly 99: 193-218.  
 266 
Huntington, Samuel P., and Jorge I. Dominguez. 1975. Political Development. In 
Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. 
Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
Huntington, Samuel P., and Clement H. Moore, eds. 1970. Authoritarian Politics in 
Modern Society. New York: Basic Books.  
Johnson, Paul. 1983. Modern Times: The World From the Twenties to the Eighties. 
New York: Harper & Row.  
Kadushin, Charles. 1979. Power Circles and Legitimacy in Developed Societies. In 
Legitimation of Regimes, ed. Bogdan Denitch, 127-40. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
Karl, Terry. 1986. Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in 
Venezuela. In Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, ed. Guiller-
mo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 196-220. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. 
New Haven: Yale University Press.  
Linz, Juan J. 1964. An Authoritarian Regime: Spain. In Cleavages, Ideologies, and 
Party Systems, ed. Erik Allardt and Yrjo Littunen. Helsinki: Academic Books-
tore.  
Linz, Juan J. 1975. Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes. In Macropolitical 
Theory, ed. Fred L. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 175-412. Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley.  
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan, eds. 1978. The Breakdown of Democratic Re-
gimes. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.  
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic 
Development and Political Legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53: 
69-105. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1963. The First New Nation. New York: Basic Books.  
Lopez-Pintor, Rafael. 1987. Mass and Elite Perspectives in the Process of Transi-
tion to Democracy. In Comparing New Democracies, ed. Enrique A. Baloyra, 79-
106. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.  
Macridis, Roy C. 1986. Modern Political Regimes: Patterns and Institutions. Bos-
ton: Little, Brown. 
Malloy, James M. 1985. Bolivia: An Incomplete Revolution. In Latin American 
Politics and Development, ed. Howard J. Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, 363-81. 
Boulder, CO: Westview. 
Malloy, James M. 1987. The Politics of Transition in Latin America. In Authorita-
rians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America, ed. James M. Malloy 
and Mitchell A. Seligson, 235-58. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Malloy, James M., and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds. 1987. Authoritarians and Demo-
crats: Regime Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University 
Press. 
Mann, Michael. 1986. The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the 
Beginning to A.D. 1760. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
McDonough, Peter. 1981. Power and Ideology in Brazil. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
Moyser, George, and Margaret Wagstaffe, eds. 1987. Research Methods for Elite 
Studies. Boston: Allen and Unwin.  
 267 
Needler, Martin C. 1987. The Problem of Democracy in Latin America. Lexington, 
MA: Lexington Books. 
Nordlinger, Eric. 1977. Soldiers and Politics: Military Coups and Governments. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.  
O’Donnell, Guillermo. 1973. Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: 
Studies in South American Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
O’Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. 1986. Transitions From Authori-
tarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.  
O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds. 1986. 
Transitions From Authoritarian Rule, vols. 1-3. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press.  
Oszlak, Oscar. 1981. The Historical Formation of the Nation-State in Latin Ameri-
ca: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for its Study. Latin Ameri-
can Research Review 16: 3-32.  
Pareto, Vilfredo. 1935. The Mind and Society: A Treatise on General Sociology. 
New York: Dover.  
Paxton, Robert O. 1972. Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf.  
Peeler, John A. 1985. Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica, Vene-
zuela. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.  
Perlmutter, Amos, ed. 1977. The Military and Politics in Modern Times. New Ha-
ven: Yale University Press.  
Prewitt, Kenneth, and Alan Stone. 1973. The Ruling Elites: Elite Theory, Power, 
and American Democracy. New York: Harper & Row. 
Putnam, Robert D. 1976. The Comparative Study of Political Elites. Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.  
Sanders, David. 1981. Patterns of Political Instability. London: Macmillan.  
Sartori, Giovanni. 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Con-
temporary Debate. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers.  
Schonfeld, William R. 1981. The ‘Closed’ Worlds of Socialist and Gaullist Elites. 
In Elites in France: Origins, Reproduction and Power, ed. Jolyon Howorth and 
Philip G. Cerny, 196-215. London: Frances Pinter.  
Share, Donald. 1987. Transitions to Democracy and Transition Through Transac-
tion. Comparative Political Studies 19: 525-48.  
Smith, Tony. 1979. The Underdevelopment of Development Theory: The Case of 
Dependency Theory. World Politics 31: 247-88.  
Steiner, Kurt. 1972. Politics in Austria. Boston: Little, Brown.  
Stiefbold, Rodney P. 1974. Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in 
Austria: Problems of Political Stability and Change. In Politics in Europe, ed. 
Martin O. Heisler, 117-77. New York: McKay.  
Thomson, David. 1969. Democracy in France Since 1870. 5th ed. London: Oxford 
University Press.  
Tilly, Charles. 1975. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press.  
Veliz, Claudio, ed. 1967. The Politics of Conformity in Latin America. London: 
Oxford University Press.  
Welsh, William A. 1979. Leaders and Elites. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.  
 268 
Wilde, Alexander W. 1978. Conversations Among Gentlemen: Oligarchical De-
mocracy in Colombia. In The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, 
ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 28-81. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
